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Abstract
We study a unique field experiment in India in which 1.5 million stock investors face lotteries
for the random allocation of shares. We find that the winners of these randomly assigned initial
public offering (IPO) lottery shares are significantly more likely to hold them than lottery losers
1, 6, and even 24 months after the random allocation. This finding strongly evokes laboratory
findings of an “endowment effect” for risky gambles, and persists in samples of highly active
investors, suggesting along with additional evidence that this behavior is not driven by inertia
alone. The effect decreases as experience in the IPO market increases, but remains even for very
experienced investors. Leading theories of the endowment effect based on reference-dependent
preferences are unable to fully explain these and other findings in the data.
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A core idea in economics is that an agent’s valuation of an object should be consistent regardless
of whether or not they own the object. We study a natural experiment that provides evidence on
this fundamental idea, in which millions of market participants are randomly assigned risky gambles.
Owing to regulation, in many cases Indian initial public offering (IPO) shares are randomly assigned
to applicants. This randomization means that winners and losers in these IPO lotteries should have
virtually identical preferences, beliefs, and information sets before the shares are allotted. While
lottery losers do not have the opportunity to buy the shares at the IPO issue price, they receive cash
back which is equivalent to the IPO issue price.1 Once the stock begins to trade freely, both winners
and losers have equal opportunities to trade in it. Given the equivalence of information sets and
background characteristics induced by the random assignment, we should expect that the holdings
of this randomly allocated stock should converge rapidly over time across the two groups. On the
other hand, if randomly assigned ownership induces changes in valuation, we will see a divergence in
behavior between randomly chosen winners and losers.
We document that the winners of IPO lotteries are substantially more likely to hold the randomly
allocated IPO shares for many months and even years after the allocation. In our main results we
find that 62.4% of IPO winners hold the IPO stock at the end of the month after listing, while only
1% of losers hold the stock. Six months after the lottery assignment the gap decreases slightly, to
46.6% of winners holding the stock and 1.6% of the losers holding the stock, but even 24 months
after the random assignment we find that winners are 35% more likely to hold the IPO stock than
losers. Furthermore, we find that the propensity of lottery winners to actively purchase additional
shares of the IPO stock is higher than the propensity of lottery losers to purchase the IPO stock at all.
The winner-loser divergence in IPO stock holdings that we observe evokes the large set of (primar-
ily) laboratory findings on the endowment effect. We follow this literature, and define this effect as a
gap, arising from the fact of ownership, between an economic agent’s willingness to accept and their
willingness to pay for an object or gamble.2 The similarity between our findings and this literature
raises the possibility that investors outside of the lab demonstrate significant endowment effects in a
1We refer to the price that lottery winners pay for the IPO stock as the “issue price,” and the first price that the stock
trades at on the exchange as the “listing price.”
2WTA is the lowest price at which a seller is willing to sell, and WTP is the highest price a buyer is willing to pay.
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high-stakes market setting. Of course, it is also possible that differences between the setting of our
natural experiment and laboratory settings might induce a divergence in behavior between winners
and losers even absent an endowment effect. We therefore enumerate the most important differences
between our setting and the laboratory experiments that have been conducted on the endowment ef-
fect. For all of these major differences, we find auxiliary evidence that they are unable to fully explain
the winner-loser divergence in holdings that we observe.
Perhaps the most important difference between our natural experiment and lab experiments of the
endowment effect is that our lottery winners and losers may face formal or informal costs of trading
which are large enough to cause the divergence in holdings that we observe. Such costs are typically
minimized (although they cannot always be eliminated) in laboratory experiments. In our setting, such
costs might include brokerage commissions, transactions costs, taxes, or inertia generated by cognitive
processing costs of paying attention to the stock, accessing the brokerage account, or placing trades.
We study this issue in detail, developing a formal framework which we describe later in the paper,
but note here that a number of empirical findings are inconsistent with this explanation. First, we find
that the divergence between winner and loser holdings remains large even in groups of investors who
transacted very frequently on average prior to the IPO – lottery winners at the 99th percentile of the
trading distribution (more than 30 trades per month on average in the six months prior to the lottery)
are still approximately 30% more likely to hold the stock than losers. Second, we find a winner-loser
divergence even in the sub-sample of investors who make a large number of trades of sizes less than
or equal to the position size of the IPO stock in the months after the IPO.3 Third, we find that even
in sub-samples of investors that have actively sold another previously allotted IPO stock, winners are
still substantially more likely to hold the current IPO stock than losers, casting doubt on the idea that
the divergence is due only to investors who do not pay attention to the IPO stocks in their portfolio.
Fourth, we find that lottery winners are more likely to make the active decision of buying additional
shares of the IPO stock than lottery losers, which is consistent with the idea that lottery winners have
a higher WTP for the stock than lottery losers. This is particularly difficult to explain using trading
3These findings also assuage concerns that our results are being driven by “trade uncertainty”– the idea that investors
are uncomfortable with trading in general and therefore stick to the status quo (Engelmann and Hollard, 2010).
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costs, even if such costs are investor, time, and security-specific. Finally, lottery losers are not more
likely to purchase another substitute stock, confirming that the winner-loser divergence in ownership
is not undone by transactions in other stocks.
Overall, we conclude that most reasonable models of inertial behavior driven by costs of trad-
ing are unlikely to explain our results.4 We also find little evidence to suggest that other differences
between our setting and laboratory experiments, such as wealth effects, capital gains taxes, or infor-
mation acquisition costs can explain our results.
We do find that the divergence in holdings attenuates substantially for the most experienced traders
in our setting, similar to the findings in List (2003) regarding the endowment effect. For each investor,
we observe the number of IPOs they have previously been allotted over the past 10 years, a measure
of experience which varies from 0 previous experiences up to 30 previous experiences at the 90th per-
centile of the distribution. Consistent with List (2003), we find a strong negative correlation between
this experience measure and the difference in holdings between lottery winners and losers, even after
controlling for many investor and IPO characteristics. However, while List (2003) finds that endow-
ment effects become negligible amongst his sample of experienced traders (sports card dealers and
very experienced non-dealers), we find substantial endowment effects even amongst investors who
have participated in over 30 IPOs – on average these highly experienced winners still hold 27% of
their lottery allotments at the end of the month of randomly receiving the IPO, while losers hold 7%
of the initial allocation.5
We next explore the extent to which leading theoretical explanations of the endowment effect
can rationalize our data. While carefully and cleverly designed laboratory experiments have been
successful in distinguishing theoretical explanations of endowment effects,6 our field setting (and very
likely most field settings) does not allow for precise conclusions regarding mechanisms. That said,
4In related work, we find that lottery winners have a higher trading intensity of the non-IPO stocks in their portfolio
than lottery losers, and tend to tilt their portfolios in the direction of the industry sector in which the IPO stock is situated,
suggesting that winning the lottery appears to reduce the (cognitive) transaction costs associated with making trades
(Anagol et al., 2015).
5These results are also interesting in light of Haigh and List (2005), who find that professional futures traders exhibit
greater myopic loss aversion and raise the possibility that market experience might exacerbate behavioral anomalies. Our
evidence rejects the idea that more experienced market participants exhibit the endowment effect anomaly more strongly.
6See, for example, (Engelmann and Hollard, 2010; Ericson and Fuster, 2014; Weaver and Frederick, 2012; Goette et
al., 2014; Heffetz and List, 2014; Sprenger, 2015; Song, 2015).
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we check the extent to which leading theoretical models of the endowment effect generate additional
predictions that are supported by the data, to add to the body of evidence on these models of individual
decision-making.
The leading class of explanations for the endowment effect is that agents have reference-dependent
preferences, as originally proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).7 We consider two variants of
reference-dependent preference explanations that are suitable to our context.8 These models differ in
their precise formulation and timing of the reference point, and as a result, are quite different from
one another in terms of their implications for the behavior that we study. First, we evaluate a model in
which the IPO issue price serves as a fixed reference point for agents (Weaver and Frederick, 2012),
i.e., the model is backward-looking in the sense that the reference point is set at the IPO issue date,
following which the agent makes decisions. In this model, lottery losers endogenously lower their
valuation for the IPO stock because they often have to purchase it at a price which is higher than the
price at which lottery winners purchase it.9 This model predicts large endowment effects if the price
lottery losers pay is far higher than the issue price, and small endowment effects when the trading price
is close to the issue price. We find mixed evidence for this prediction. On the first day of trading,
lottery losers almost never purchase the stock irrespective of the difference between the market price
and the issue price. However, by the end of the first full month of trading, lottery losers do appear
more likely to purchase IPO stocks with smaller gaps between the current market price and the issue
price, particularly in samples of more active traders. That said, the estimated winner-loser divergence
even for these small listing gain stocks does not go to zero.
Second, we consider a broader framework where the referent is the entire distribution of the agent’s
expected outcomes (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007), i.e., the reference point is forward-looking, in
the sense that it depends on the agent’s expectations about future payoffs. This formulation makes the
prediction that choices between gambles and certain amounts exhibit an “endowment effect for risk.”
7See Pope and Schweitzer (2011) for field evidence on reference-dependent preferences, and Pope and Sydnor (2016)
for a recent review of field evidence on behavioral anomalies more broadly.
8Appendix B discusses evidence on a series of non-reference dependent theories.
9Note that a standard expected utility decision maker does not consider the issue price in choosing whether to purchase
the stock as a lottery loser. She will just compare her valuation for the stock with the market price, and purchase if her
valuation is higher.
4
That is, when considering the decision of whether to take on a risky lottery, decision-makers already
endowed with a risky lottery will be less risk-averse than decision-makers that are endowed with a
certain amount.10 New lab work finds significant evidence for this effect (Sprenger, 2015).
We develop two models which apply expectations-based reference-dependent preferences to our
setting. The first is the Sprenger (2015) model, in which agents evaluate the comparison between the
IPO stock (which we treat as a risky gamble in the model) and cash. In this model, we find that that a
plan to hold the IPO stock only as a winner of the IPO lottery is not a preferred personal equilibrium
(PPE) because if a plan to hold the stock after the lottery delivers the highest utility, then this plan
should be pursued regardless of whether or not the agent wins the lottery. The model can, however,
deliver the endowment effect as a personal equilibrium (PE), though the range of parameters required
to deliver this result are narrow and run contrary to the pattern of actual returns experienced by Indian
IPOs.11 To be more specific, the model requires that agents expect IPOs that they apply for will
deliver “medium-sized” returns in the future, which is strongly counterfactual in the historical data in
India (and more generally for a broad range of markets), in which IPOs have delivered significantly
negative (raw and adjusted) returns.
The second model in this class more closely matches features of our real-world experimental
environment – agents in this augmented model evaluate both the initial risky gamble of the lottery as-
signment of the IPO, as well as the subsequent comparison between the IPO stock and cash. We again
find a very limited possible range of beliefs about IPO stock returns that could generate the endow-
ment effect plan as a PE or PPE. As we describe more fully in the text, an additional prediction of this
augmented model is that low anticipated probabilities of winning the lottery are more likely to gen-
10Put differently, agents endowed with a gamble and given the choice of a certain amount in the gamble’s outcome
support are predicted to exhibit near-risk-neutrality, while those endowed with the certain amount are predicted to exhibit
risk-aversion when given the choice of taking the gamble. For lottery losers, loss-aversion acts to reduce risk-taking
because losers compare the potential loss on the stock to their reference point of holding cash. For lottery winners,
however, loss-aversion has both positive and negative effects on risk-taking. Loss-aversion increases risk-taking when the
reference point is holding the stock and the lottery winner compares selling the stock for cash, because the stock might go
up after he has sold it. On the other hand, loss-aversion reduces risk-taking when the investor considers holding the stock
when his plan was to hold the stock, because the stock could go down and the investor compares this to the possibility that
the stock could have gone up. These two forces offset each other, making the total risk-taking propensity of the winner
lower than the lottery loser. This is the same intuition as in Sprenger (2015).
11A plan is a PE if the agent does not want to deviate from their plan. A PPE requires that both the agent does not want
to deviate from their plan, and that the plan offers the highest possibility utility among all PEs.
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erate the endowment effect. However, while we do find in the data that estimated endowment effects
become smaller as the probability of winning the lottery increases, the quantitative magnitude of this
relationship is very small. Overall, the evidence suggests that expectations-based reference-dependent
preferences are unlikely to be the only explanation for the winner-loser divergence in holdings that
we observe.
To summarize, we find that even after controlling for IPO market and trading experience, many
market participants act as if they have higher valuations for a gamble when they are randomly endowed
with it. This is novel evidence which strongly evokes the endowment effect in a naturally occurring
market outside of the laboratory.12 We do not find conclusive evidence that our results can be fully
explained by leading theoretical explanations, such as reference dependent preferences, that have
proven useful in explaining lab endowment effects. Other theoretical explanations, such as “warm
glow” models (e.g., Morewedge et al., 2009, Bordalo et al., 2012) seem to hold more promise to
explain our findings, and we discuss these possibilities in greater detail in the conclusion of our paper.
Our findings lend credence to previous theoretical work that explains financial market behavior
based on the assumption of investors with endowment effects. In the IPO market, at a minimum,
our empirical results provide evidence to support the assumption that retail investors allotted IPO
shares have a strong tendency to continue to hold these shares. This is a common assumption in this
literature (see, for example, Loughran and Ritter (2002)). Moreover, this assumption helps to justify
more complex features of this market. For example, Zhang (2004) presents a model in which investors
demonstrate the endowment effect, and shows that such a model can rationalize the otherwise difficult
to explain fact that underwriters often over-allocate IPO shares and then commit to buying them back
in the aftermarket.
More broadly, our findings support previous theoretical work that explains financial market behav-
ior based on the assumption of investors with endowment effects. Baker et. al. (2007) argue that the
presence of inertial investors, where inertia may be itself caused by the endowment effect, can explain
the prevalence of stock for stock (versus cash for stock) mergers. In a stock for stock merger, if target
12This adds credibly identified, large scale evidence from a natural experiment to studies such as Shefrin and Statman
(1985) and Odean (1998), which suggest that the endowment effect exists in securities markets.
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firm investors demonstrate the endowment effect, then they will be less likely to sell the acquirer’s
shares, thus reducing the negative price impact of the merger. In a related vein, numerous papers in
the behavioural asset pricing literature (Barber and Odean, 2008, DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009, Hir-
shleifer et al., 2009) make the point that investor inattention can cause prices to under react to news
announcements. Our findings also have implications that are related: if the investors in a stock are
subject to the endowment effect, they will also be less likely to sell in response to negative news about
the stock, which would also cause prices to under react to such news arrival and exacerbate the effects
of inattention.
1 The Experiment: India’s IPO Lotteries
Our experiment uses the Indian retail investor IPO lottery as a naturally occurring setting in which
some agents are randomly endowed with an asset while others are not, and where we can observe
agents’ choices to trade the asset following the random endowment. In this section we describe the
circumstances in which these lotteries occur (including a specific example), and in the next section
describe how they can be used to estimate endowment effects. We provide the precise details of the
IPO lottery process and associated regulations in Appendix Section A.2.13
To summarize, these IPO lotteries arise in situations in which an IPO is oversubscribed, and the
use of a proportional allocation rule to allocate shares would violate the minimum lot size of shares
set by the firm. In these situations, the lottery is run to give investors who applied for shares their
proportional allocation in expectation. The outcome of the lottery is that some investors who applied
receive the minimum lot size, while others who applied receive zero shares. The fundamental reason
for the lottery is that in India, regulations require that a firm must set aside 30% or 35% of its shares
(depending on the type of issue) to be available for allocation to retail investors at the time of IPO. For
the purposes of the regulation, “retail investors” are defined as those with expressed share demands
beneath a preset value. At the time of writing, this preset value is set by the regulator at Rs. 200,000
13As with many other details of regulation in the country, the Indian regulatory process for IPOs is quite complex.
Several papers (e.g., Anagol and Kim, 2012; Campbell et al., 2015) have used this complexity of the Indian regulatory
process to cleanly identify a range of economic phenomena.
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(roughly US$ 3,400); this value has varied over time (see Appendix Section A.1).14
The share allocation process in an Indian IPO begins with the lead investment bank, which sets
an indicative range of prices. The upper bound of this range (the “ceiling price”) cannot be more than
20% higher than the lower bound (or “floor price”). Importantly, a minimum number of shares (the
“minimum lot size”) that can be purchased at IPO is also determined at this time. All IPO bids, and
ultimately, share allocations, are constrained to be integer multiples of this minimum lot size.
Retail investors can submit two types of bids for IPO shares. 93% of bids are “cutoff” bids, where
the retail investor commits to purchasing a stated multiple of the minimum lot size at the final issue
price that the firm chooses within the price band. To submit the bid, the retail investor deposits an
amount into an escrow account, which is equal to the ceiling of the price band multiplied by the
desired number of shares. If the investor is allotted shares, and the final issue price is less than the
ceiling price, the difference between the deposited and required amounts is refunded as cash to the
investor.15
Once all bids have been submitted the total levels of demand and supply of shares are set and
regulation determines how shares will be allotted in the case that demand exceeds supply. We define
retail over subscription v as the ratio of total retail demand for a firm’s shares to total supply of shares
by the firm to retail investors. There are then three possible cases:
1. v≤ 1. In this case, all retail investors are allotted shares according to their demand schedules.
2. v > 1, and shares can be allocated to investors in proportion to their stated demands without
any violation of the minimum lot size constraint. There is no lottery involved in this case.
3. v >> 1 (the issue is substantially oversubscribed), and a number of investors under a propor-
tional allocation scheme would receive an allocation which is lower than the minimum lot size.
This constraint cannot be violated by law, and therefore, all such investors are entered into a
14This regulatory definition technically permits institutions to be classified as retail when investing amounts smaller
than the limit, but over our sample period, we verify using independent account classifications from the depositories that
this very rarely occurs.
15The remaining investors in our sample submitted “full demand schedule” bids. In this type of bid the investor
specifies the number of lots that they would like to purchase at each possible price within the indicative range, once again
depositing in escrow the maximum monetary amount consistent with their demand schedule at the time of submitting their
bid, with a cash refund processed for any difference between the final price and the amount placed in escrow.
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lottery. In this lottery, the probability of receiving the minimum lot size is proportional to the
number of shares in the original bid and lottery applicants receive their proportional allotment
in expectation.16
This third case, in which the lottery takes place, provides the random variation that we exploit to
test for the endowment effect. Far from being an unusual occurrence, in our sample alone (which is a
subset of all IPOs in the Indian market over the sample period), roughly 1.5 million Indian investors
participate in such lotteries over the 2007 to 2012 period in the set of 54 IPOs that we study.
For IPOs after May 2010 (32 of the total 54 IPOs in our sample) regulation mandates the fol-
lowing time line for the application and allotment process. Applications are received over a two-day
period termed the “subscription period.” Our data provider, in conjunction with the designated stock
exchange, determines the winners and losers in an IPO lottery on the seventh day after the subscrip-
tion period. Investors who lost the lottery receive their refund or the amount is “unblocked” from their
banks by approximately 10 days after the subscription period. Refunds may be issued through direct
credit into a bank account using the National Electronic Fund Transfer Service or through mailing a
physical check. All lottery losers receive a complete refund.17 The first day of trading commences
two days after the refund is issued, i.e., 12 days from the close of an IPO issue. Prior to May 2010, a
similar but longer timeline was mandated, with the requirement that the IPO shares list within 22 days
after the subscription period. In this prior period, regulation required that refunds were processed by
the 15th day after the subscription period (Das, 2015).
An Example: Barak Valley Cements IPO Allocation Process. Barak Valley Cements’ IPO opened
for subscription for the two day period October 29, 2007 through November 1, 2007. The stock was
simultaneously listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)
on November 23, 2007. The price that lottery winners paid for the stock, which we refer to as the
16Appendix Section A.4 shows a mathematical derivation of the probabilities of winning allotments based on the level
of excess demand.
17Conversations with market participants suggest most lottery losers are refunded through electronic payments prior to
the listing date, but we are not aware of any data documenting the refund process. One potential concern is that delays in
receiving refunds may cause lottery losers to be credit constrained, and therefore unable to purchase their desired quantity
of IPO stock. In Figure A.1.13 of the appendix we find that the winner-loser divergence in holdings is large for even the
largest portfolios, making it unlikely that credit constraints due to late refunds can explain the majority of our results.
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“issue price” throughout the paper, was Rs. 42 per share. The price the stock first traded at on the
market, which we we refer to as the “listing price,” was 62 rupees per share. The stock closed on the
first day of listing at Rs. 56.05 per share, for a 33.45% listing day gain. The retail over subscription
rate v for this issue was 37.62. Given this high v, all retail investors that applied for this IPO were
entered into a lottery.
Appendix Table A.1.1 shows the official retail investor IPO allocation data for Barak Valley Ce-
ments.18 Each row of column (0) of the table shows the share category c, associated with a number
of shares applied for given in column (1), which, given the minimum lot size x = 150 for this offer is
just cx. In this case, the total number of share categories (C) equals 15, meaning that the maximum
retail bid is for 2,250 shares.19 Column (2) of the table shows the total number of retail investor
applications received for each share category, and column (3) is the product of columns (1) and (2).
Column (4) shows the investor allocation under a proportional allocation rule, i.e., cxv . Given that
these proportional allocations are all below the minimum lot size of 150 shares, regulation requires
the firm to conduct a lottery to decide share allocations.
Column (5) shows the probability of winning the lottery for each share category c, which is p = cv .
For example, 2.7% of investors that applied for the minimum lot size of 150 shares will receive this
allocation, and the remaining 97.3% of investors applying in this share category will receive no shares.
In contrast, 40.6% of investors in share category c = 15 receive the minimum lot size x = 150 shares.
For this particular IPO, all retail investors are entered into a lottery, and ultimately receive either zero
or 150 shares of the IPO. Column (6) shows the total number of shares ultimately allotted to investors
in each share category, which is the product of x, column (2), and column (5). Columns (7) and
(8) show the total sizes of the winner and loser groups in each share category for the Barak Valley
Cements IPO lottery, respectively.
It is perhaps easiest to think of our data as comprising a large number of experiments, in which
each experiment is a share category within an IPO. Within each experiment the probability of treatment
18These data are obtained from http://www.chittorgarh.com/ipo/ipo_boa.asp?a=134.
19The number of share categories is capped at 15 here because C = 16 would correspond to 2,400 shares, and a
subscription amount of Rs. 100,800 at the issue price of Rs. 42. This subscription amount would violate the prevailing
(in 2007) regulatory maximum retail investor application constraint of Rs. 100,000 rupees per IPO.
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is the same for all applicants, and we exploit this source of randomness, combining all of these
experiments together to estimate the average causal effect of winning an IPO lottery on future holdings
of the IPO stock.
Data. When an individual investor applies to receive shares in an Indian IPO, the application is
routed through a registrar. In the event of heavy oversubscription leading to a randomized allotment
of shares, the registrar (in consultation with the stock exchange on which the shares list) performs
the randomization which determines which investors are allocated. We obtain data on the full set of
applicants to 85 Indian IPOs over the period from 2007 to 2012 (54 of these IPOs had at least one
randomized share category), from one of India’s largest registrars. This registrar handled the largest
number of IPOs by any one firm in India since 2006, covering roughly a quarter of all IPOs between
2002 and 2012, and roughly a third of all IPOs over our sample period.20 In this paper, we study only
the category of retail accounts, as the IPO lottery only applies to this group of investors. For each IPO
in our sample, we observe whether or not the applicant was allocated shares, the share category c for
which they applied, the geographic location of the applicant by pincode (similar, but larger than, zip
codes in the U.S.), the type of bid placed by the applicant, the share depository in which the applicant
has an account (more on this below), whether the applicant was an employee of the firm, and a few
other application characteristics.
We match the data on application lotteries to a second major data source which allows us to char-
acterize the equity investing behavior of the IPO applicants. We obtain these data from a broader sam-
ple of information on investor equity portfolios from Central Depository Services Limited (CDSL).
Alongside the other major depository, National Securities Depositories Limited (NSDL), CDSL fa-
cilitates the regulatory requirement that settlement of all listed shares traded in the stock market must
occur in electronic form.21 Every applicant for an IPO must register to open (or already have) an ac-
20Appendix Figure A.1.1 shows that our sample of IPOs tracks aggregate Indian IPO waves, with a decline in 2009,
and high numbers of IPOs in 2008 and 2010. Appendix Table A.1.2 presents summary statistics on our sample of IPOs.
Our sample accounts for 22% of all IPOs over this period by number, and US$ 2.65 BN or roughly 8% of total IPO value
over the period.
21CDSL has a significant market share – in terms of total assets tracked, roughly 20%, and in terms of the number
of accounts, roughly 40%, with the remainder in NSDL. While we do also have access to the NSDL data (these data are
used extensively and carefully described in Campbell et al., 2014), we are only able to link the CDSL data with the IPO
allocation information.
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count with either of the two depositories (CDSL and NSDL), as the option to receive allocated shares
in an IPO in physical form does not exist. To match the IPO applications data to the CDSL accounts
data, we use anonymous identification numbers of household accounts from both data sources. We
then verify the accuracy of the match by checking common geographic information fields provided
by both data providers such as state and pincode.22 To provide a sense of the magnitudes in the data,
when adjusted for per-capita GDP differences between the US and India, the account value distri-
bution and trading activity for the universe of investors in the CDSL data and the lottery sample are
similar to those in the US (see Appendix Figure A.1.3 (a) and (b)).
All CDSL trading accounts are associated with a tax related permanent account number (PAN),
and regulation requires that an investor with a given PAN number can only apply once for any given
IPO.23 Thus no investor account may simultaneously belong to both the winner and loser group, or be
allocated twice in the same IPO. However, it is possible that a household with multiple members with
different PAN numbers could submit multiple applications for a given IPO in an attempt to increase
the household’s likelihood of winning. While we do not directly control for this possibility, we believe
that this is unlikely to materially affect our inferences, as we discuss in more detail in the Appendix.
2 Documenting the Winner-Loser Divergence
We estimate the causal effect of winning the IPO lottery on various measures of holdings of the IPO
stock for each (event) month t, by estimating cross-sectional regressions of the form:
yi jc = α +ρI{successi jc=1}+ γ jc + εi jc. (1)
Here, yi jc is an outcome variable of interest, such as an indicator for whether the account holds the
IPO stock, for applicant i in IPO j, share category c. I{successi jc=1} is an indicator variable that takes
the value of 1 if the applicant was successful in the lottery for IPO j in category c (investor is in the
22We are able to match 99.5 percent of our IPO lottery applicants to our data on portfolio holdings.
23In July 2007 it became mandatory that all applicants provide their PAN information in IPO applications. (SEBI
circular No.MRD/DoP/Cir-05/2007 came into force on April 27, 2007. Accessed at http://goo.gl/OB61M2 on 19 Septem-
ber 2014.) We confirm there are no violations of this regulation in our data, by checking across all brokerage accounts
associated with the anonymized tax identification number of each investor.
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winner group), and 0 otherwise (investor is in the loser group). ρ are the estimated treatment effects
in each event-month t. γ jc are fixed effects associated with each IPO share category experiment in
our sample. Angrist, Pathak and Walters (2013) refer to these experiment-level fixed effects as “risk
group” fixed effects. Conditional on the inclusion of these fixed effects, variation in winning the
lottery is random, meaning that the inclusion of controls should have no effect on our point estimates
of ρ . We run this regression separately for different months after the IPO stock is allotted to examine
how the winner-loser divergence varies over time.24
Randomization Check. Table 1 presents summary statistics and a randomization check comparing
our lottery winner and loser groups. Columns (1) and (2) present the means of variables listed in the
row headers in winner and loser groups respectively, and Column (3) presents the difference across
the two samples. All of these variables are measured the month before allotment of the IPO. If the
allocation of IPO shares is truly random, we would expect few statistically significant differences
across winner and loser groups prior to the assignment of the IPO shares. Column (4) calculates the
% of our 383 share category experiments in which the winner and loser groups were significantly
different at the 10% level. Under the null hypothesis that winning the lottery is random, we expect
that roughly 10% of these experiments will exhibit a significant difference at the 10% level.
The first variable we check for balance on is whether accounts that won the current lottery were
also more likely to have been successful in receiving IPO shares in the past. If it was possible to
“game” the lottery and increase one’s probability of winning we would expect current winners to
have also been more successful in the past.25 Table 1 shows that virtually identical fractions (38%) of
24See Chapter 3 of Angrist and Pischke (2008) for a discussion of how regression with fixed effects for each exper-
imental group identifies the parameter of interest using only the experimental variation. Angrist (1998) shows that our
estimated treatment effect ρ is a weighted average of the treatment effects from each separate share category experiment.
Intuitively, the regression weights give more importance to experiments in which the probability of treatment is closer to
1
2 , and experiments with larger sample sizes – i.e., experiments in which there are many accounts in both treatment and
control groups. In our summary statistics tables described below and throughout the remainder of the paper, mean values
for lottery winner and loser groups are calculated across share categories using the same weighting scheme employed in
the regressions.
25In the case of IPOs for which our data provider was the registrar, we can directly measure whether or not an account
applied to an IPO in each of periods +1 to +6. For IPOs where our data provider was not the registrar, we can observe
whether the account was allotted shares since we see allotments for the entire universe of IPOs from the CDSL data. We
set the outcome variable to one in either case – if we see an application for IPOs for which our data provider was the
registrar, or if we see an allotment for IPOs not covered by our registrar – and zero otherwise. We focus on this combined
measure because it includes all of the information available to us.
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both winner and loser investors applied to an IPO with our registrar, or were allotted shares in an IPO
not covered by our registrar, in the month prior to allotment.
The next set of variables describes the trading behavior of our winner and loser groups. 68.2% of
lottery applicants made a trade in the month prior to the lottery. Over half the accounts make between
1 and 10 trades in the month prior to the IPO, and roughly 5% of accounts made over 20 trades in that
month. The next variables present summary statistics on the fraction of accounts that made trades in
position sizes less than or equal to the value of the IPO allotment. This is useful to look at because
the lottery allotments are the minimum lot size, so we would like to have a sense of how common it
is for our lottery participants to trade in such “small” position sizes. In fact, we find that 63.5% of
applicants made a trade of a size less than or equal to the size of the lottery allotment in the month
prior to the IPO. This result shows that while the lottery allotments appear small in dollar terms, it is
actually very common for these investors to trade in amounts that are of equal or smaller size.26 We
also look at the propensity of both winner and loser group investors to “flip” IPOs that they had been
allotted in the past. We define flipping as selling an allotted IPO in the allotment month. We find
that close to 30% of investors in both winner and loser group investors have this propensity, which is
striking in light of our later results on the divergence between the post-allotment ownership patterns
of winners and losers.
The remaining rows of the table summarize other account characteristics. 78% of winner and loser
investors had an account value greater than zero in the month prior to the IPO. Portfolio value amounts
are highly skewed so we transform this variable using the inverse hyperbolic sine function27 – we find
that the mean (US$ 530 on average) and distribution of portfolio values are very similar across winner
and loser accounts. Winner and loser accounts on average hold 9 securities in their portfolio before
allotment. Approximately 30% of accounts are less than six months old, roughly 33% are between 7
and 25 months old, and the remaining 37% of accounts are over 25 months old.
26The fraction of experiments that show significant differences on the dummy variables for making greater than ten
transactions less than the allotment size are large primarily in experiments that have small sample sizes. The large sample
basis for this statistical test is less applicable in these cases.
27sinh−1(z) = log(z+(z2 + 1)1/2). This is a common alternative to the log transformation which has the additional
benefit of being defined for the whole real line. The transformation is close to being logarithmic for high values of the
z and close to linear for values of z close to zero. See, for example, Burbidge, Magee and Robb (1988) and Browning,
Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994).
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Overall, we find that the differences across winner and loser groups are small and typically not sta-
tistically significant at standard levels. The fraction of experiments with greater than 10% significance
is around 10%. Given the similarity of winner and loser groups across this wide set of background
characteristics, we confirm that the IPO shares allocated through the lottery mechanism are indeed
randomly assigned to investors.
Characterizing the Treatment. Table 2 provides summary statistics on the applications of winning
investors, and the allotments that these investors received after winning the IPO share lottery. Col-
umn (1) of the table shows the mean across all lottery winning investors in the 383 share category
experiments, for each of the variables listed in the row headers. Columns (2) through (6) present the
percentile of each variable in terms of the distribution across all of the experiments.28 On average,
given the balance between winners and losers, both lottery winners and losers put 1,751 dollars into
an escrow account to participate in the lottery (row 1, Table 2). Lottery winners receive an average of
150 dollars worth of the IPO stock in the IPO lottery (row 3). They also receive an instant gain of US$
62 on average, because IPO stocks’ listing price is 39% higher than the issue price on average (row 5).
Lottery losers cannot purchase the stock at the issue price, so the average endowment that the winners
receive (which the losers do not) is US$ 212 (150 + 62) of the IPO stock. Both winners and losers get
refunds from their escrow accounts of approximately US$ 1,600 and US$ 1,750, respectively.
Full Sample: Graphical Analysis. Figure 1 presents our main result in graphical form. Figures 1a
and 1b plot the fraction of winners (black triangles) and fraction of losers (green circles) that hold
the IPO stock in a given share category experiment at the end of the first day of trading. Figure 1a
plots this measure against the percentage listing return29 on the x-axis, while Figure 1b has the dollar
value of the listing gain on the x-axis. Figures 1c and 1d plot the fractions of winners and losers
that hold the IPO stock at the end of the first full month post-listing on the y-axis. Figure 1c has the
percentage return on the stock to the end of the first month on the x-axis, and Figure 1d replaces this
with the change in the dollar value of the IPO allotment over the same interval on the x-axis. All
28We first calculate the mean within each experiment, and then report the corresponding percentile across the exper-
iments. For example, the median share category experiment had a mean application amount of 792 dollars (first row of
Table 2).
29The listing return is the percentage price change from the price the lottery winners pay for the stock (issue price) to
the first trading price (listing price).
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four figures show a sizeable gap between between the holding rates for lottery winners and lottery
losers, consistent with the presence of a valuation gap between winners and losers.30 In Figures 1c
and 1d, we also observe that lottery winners are less likely to hold the stock as the stock’s realized
return increases, although the gap between winners’ and losers’ holdings remains. These patterns
are consistent with the co-existence of the well-known “disposition effect” in the winner group (first
uncovered by Shefrin and Statman (1985)), alongside the holdings divergence between winners and
losers that we uncover.3132
Full Sample: Estimation Results. Table 3 presents our main estimates. The first column presents
statistics as of the end of the first day of trading (“Listing Day”). The remaining columns show the
portfolio behavior observed at the end of each event month following the IPO listing (month zero is
the listing month). Each row header marked “Dependent Variable” details a different measure of the
holdings of the IPO stock. Within each row header, the first and second rows present the estimated
weighted mean of the variable in the winner (w) and loser (l) groups, and the third row presents the
estimated ρ̂ from equation 1, i.e., the weighted (across experiments) difference between the winner
and loser group means.
The first row header provides results when the dependent variable is an indicator for whether
the account holds any of the treatment IPO stock. At the end of the first day of trading, we find
that approximately 70% of lottery winners hold the IPO stock, while only 0.007% of losers hold
the IPO stock. This difference is significant at the 1% level. One way to interpret this result is
that approximately 30% of applicants, on average, do not show an endowment effect because their
behavior is consistent regardless of whether they randomly won or lost the lottery.33
At the end of the listing month (0), lottery winners are 62% more likely to hold the IPO stock
than lottery losers. This divergence declines to 46% at the end of six months, with all differences
30Many of the vertically aligned points represent different share categories of the same IPO. We exploit this variation
later in testing how the winner-loser divergence varies with the probability of winning.
31An endowment effect in our setting is conceptually distinct from the disposition effect. It is possible that owning a
stock has a causal effect on the investor’s valuation of it regardless of whether an investor’s experienced return on a stock
affects their propensity to sell.
32Appendix Figure A.1.7 shows the corresponding results holdings of the IPO stock at the end of the first week.
33We only present the first day results for the indicator for holding the IPO stock (I(Holds IPO Stock)) because this
variable is the most reliably estimated given our data. Appendix A.7 describes the assumptions we need to make to
determine whether an account held the IPO stock at the end of the listing day using our monthly holdings data.
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significant at the 1% level. The loser group means show that it is relatively rare for lottery losers to
own the stock – on average 1% of lottery losers own the IPO stock in the month in which it lists, this
number only rises to 1.6% six months post-listing.
The second row header defines the dependent variable as the fraction of the potential IPO allotment
that the account holds. For example, if winners in a particular share category lottery won ten shares
and a given account holds five shares, the dependent variable would be defined as 0.5. For lottery
losers this variable is also defined as the number of shares of the IPO stock they hold divided by
the allotment they would have received had they won the lottery. For example if winners won ten
shares, then a loser account that chose to purchase five shares on the market would have this measure
equal to 0.5. For this measure, the divergence is slightly smaller at the end of month 1, but otherwise
very similar to the first row. However, a comparison of lottery loser means across the first and second
variables reveals that conditional on holding the IPO stock, lottery losers choose to hold a substantially
larger fraction than the lottery allotment. In particular, Column (1) for month 0 shows that while only
1% of the lottery losers hold the stock, their average fraction of the lottery allotment is 4.4%, implying
that lottery losers who choose to own the stock purchase roughly four and a half times the amount of
the lottery allotment.34
The third row of the table is an indicator for whether the account holds exactly the number of
shares allotted to winners in the relevant share category. Results here are similar to those in the first
row, suggesting that most of the divergence between winners and losers arises from lottery winners
continuing to hold initial allotments, while losers are unlikely to hold the exact amount of the lottery
allotment.
The fourth row shows the US$ value of the IPO stock held in the portfolio at the end of the month.
Lottery winners hold US$ 108 more of the stock than losers on average at the end of the first month,
US$ 84 more at the end of the second month, and US$ 55 more at the end of the sixth month. This
measure includes differences in chosen holdings between winners and losers, as well as returns earned
on those shares, meaning that some of the decline in this measure is attributable to significant negative
34Suppose there are 10,000 lottery losers, the lottery allotment (to winners) was 10 shares, and 100 losers purchase the
stock (1%). Also suppose that those 100 losers choose to purchase 50 shares. Then, the average fraction of the allotment
held by lottery losers will be 5% (.01*5+.99*0 = .05).
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returns on these IPO stocks on average, as we describe below. The fifth row shows the weight of IPO
stock in the investor’s portfolio, and shows that lottery winners hold 13% more of their portfolio in
the IPO stock in month 0, which remains 6.4% higher, six months after allotment.
The final rows of the table show average percentage returns to holding the IPO stock to the end
of each month. On average the listing return is 42%. The next two rows show cumulative returns
from holding the stock assuming that the stock was (1) won in the lottery, or (2) purchased at the
listing price, and the final row shows the average returns from holding the Indian market portfolio
measured over the same intervals. The returns data show that lottery winners on average lost money
based on their choice to continue to hold the stock after it was initially listed, since (raw or market-
adjusted) returns measured from the listing price are large and negative. In this sense, lottery losers
in our sample make a relatively good decision (on average) to not purchase these IPO stocks at the
first trading price. Clearly, what constitutes a good decision depends on the realization of returns in
any particular sample, but the key result is that the two groups chose to make substantially different
decisions about holding the stock.35
Appendix Table A.1.4 extends the analysis to 24 months after the lottery.36 We find that even 24
months after allotment, lottery winners are 36% more likely to hold the IPO stock than the lottery
losers. However, lottery losers’ propensity to hold the stock stays relatively constant, at around 1.5 to
1.7% over these 24 months.
3 Relating the Winner-Loser Divergence to the Endowment Ef-
fect
The winner-loser divergence we find is reminiscent of the large laboratory literature documenting
the endowment effect, which is the idea that ownership of an object has a causal effect on an agent’s
valuation of the object. Broadly speaking, our natural experiment resembles the “exchange paradigm”
35For example, if this pattern of negative post-issue returns were predictable, then we would expect both lottery winners
and losers to choose not to hold the stock after listing.
36The results for periods one and four months after IPO listing are slightly different from those in Table 3 because we
restrict this analysis to those IPOs where we can observe the portfolios of lottery winners and losers at least 24 months
after the IPO allotment.
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of endowment effect experiments (Ericson and Fuster, 2014). In this paradigm, subjects are initially
randomly assigned to receive one of two objects, A or B, of approximately equal value (e.g., a mug
and a pen). In the subsequent stage of the experiment the subjects are given the opportunity to trade
and potentially acquire the object that they were not originally endowed with. The extent to which
the holdings at the end of this trading stage depart from equal proportions in groups initially assigned
goods A and B provides a quantitative estimate of the endowment effect.
As a starting point, it is useful to think of good A as the IPO stock which is randomly assigned
to our lottery winners, and good B as the cash from the escrow account that is returned to lottery
losers. For identification purposes, the key similarity of our setting with the laboratory exchange
paradigm is that the subjects who receive the IPO stock are randomly chosen. This removes the
standard selection problem of owners of objects having higher valuations for the object than non-
owners. The second important similarity is that we can subsequently observe the holding behavior
of the randomly endowed objects in a setting where the participants can trade at relatively low cost
– when the stock lists on the market, this is analogous to the experimenter giving the laboratory
subjects the opportunity to exchange. The final important similarity is that to estimate the size of the
endowment effect, we compare the fraction of lottery winners who hold the IPO stock to the fraction
of lottery losers who hold the IPO stock after both groups have had the opportunity to exchange.
It is worth noting here that in our setting, as well as in the laboratory exchange paradigm, it is not
possible to estimate the magnitude of the gap between the WTA of owners and the WTP of losers.
However, we argue that the holding behavior of stock investors is an intrinsically interesting outcome
in itself (see Baker, Coval and Stein (2007), for example), even if the WTA-WTP gap is small.
Our natural experiment has a number of important differences with the laboratory exchange
paradigm. Each of these differences opens up the possibility of an explanation for our results that
does not involve a WTA-WTP gap (i.e., an explanation other than the endowment effect.) In this sec-
tion we enumerate the major differences between our natural experiment and the laboratory exchange
paradigm experiments, and present evidence on the extent to which these differences can explain the
winner-loser divergence in holdings we observe. In the subsequent section, we return to theories that
have been used to explain the endowment effect, to see whether they can explain our results.
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Wealth Effects and Taxes. The participants in our natural experiment who are randomly endowed
with the IPO stock also receive a wealth shock relative to the lottery losers, since winners are allowed
to purchase the IPO stock at the issue price and then sell it at the listing price.37 In contrast, in
exchange paradigm experiments, the objects are typically chosen to be of equal value, so there is no
wealth shock.38
In our setting, the key consideration is that the US$ 62 wealth gain lottery winners obtain over
losers is very small relative to the US$ 1,750 that all lottery applicants initially put in escrow to
participate in the lottery. This small gain is unlikely to be relieving a major wealth constraint for
winners relative to losers, as we know that both groups have substantial cash on hand in their escrow
accounts, and indeed, prior to the commencement of trading in the IPO stock given the timing of
refunds. Overall, we find little evidence to suggest that these explanations play an important role. We
provide the results of further specific tests of explanations in this class in Appendix A.6.
Inertia Associated with Costs of Trading. In exchange paradigm experiments, the explicit/formal
cost of trading is zero. In our setting, there are monetary costs of transacting, such as brokerage
fees and securities transactions taxes. The presence of these costs makes it possible that a divergence
in lottery winner and loser holdings could emerge even in the absence of a WTA-WTP gap. This
motivates us to comprehensively investigate the extent to which such costs can explain the differences
we find.39
Relatedly, subjects in exchange paradigm experiments are explicitly prompted about whether they
would like to trade one good for the other. This makes it plausible to believe that laboratory subjects
have actively thought about whether they would like to exchange good A for good B (although these
prompts cannot, of course, guarantee that this is the case). In our setting, there is no experimenter
encouraging the investor to actively consider whether they want to sell (lottery winners) or buy (lottery
37Lottery losers cannot purchase the stock at the issue price, meaning that the change in value of the allotted stock
between listing and issue prices constitutes a wealth gain (or loss) for lottery winners (62 dollars on average). The wealth
gain is not equal to the total amount of the endowment because lottery losers receive a refund equal to the amount of the
allotted stock, valued at the issue price.
38Our discussion of wealth effects also includes the possibility of a “house money effect” explaining our results, as
both are unlikely to explain our results for similar reasons. See the appendix for details.
39While exchange experiments have no monetary costs of trading, they of course may have important infor-
mal/psychological costs of engaging in trading.
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losers) the IPO stock after it begins to trade. Previous work such as Odean (1999) and Merton (1987),
argues that investors will only pay attention to a limited number of stocks. Thus, we need to be careful
to rule out the possibility that costs associated with paying attention to the IPO stock might generate
differences in the holding behavior of winners and losers even in the absence of an endowment effect.
We therefore evaluate the extent to which our results can be explained by inaction induced by
the costs (physical or psychological) associated with implementing a trade. To do so, we begin with
a model of inertial behavior that arises due to such costs (as separate from inertia induced by an
endowment effect) to guide our empirical evaluation.40
Let wai jt represent investor i’s willingness to accept (WTA) for stock j at time t. This level of
WTA could be due to portfolio diversification motives, liquidity shocks, psychological factors, or
anything else that determines whether the investor wants the stock in her portfolio. Let wpi jt be that
same investor’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the stock. This model does not include an endowment
effect, so we assume wai jt = w
p
i jt for all investors i, for all stocks j, at any time t.
Next, we denote by c all costs associated with making a trade in the stock. This includes the cog-
nitive cost of paying attention to the stock or to the act of trading, standard monetary costs (brokerage
commissions, transactions costs, and security transaction taxes), or nuisance factors (e.g., a lost bro-
kerage account password). Moreover, c also captures non-rational costs that might drive inertia, such
as costs of dealing with self-control problems that lead to procrastination.41
The presence of cost c can induce inertia that inhibits trading. Such cost-induced inertia will
manifest itself both when investors hold a stock, as well as when they are contemplating buying a
stock. Let p jt be the market price of stock j at time t. A potential seller will choose to sell the stock
if the revenue from selling, including the transaction cost, is greater than their WTA: p jt − c > wai jt .
Rewriting this inequality, the agent sells if p jt −wai jt > c. Intuitively, if the gap between the market
40Substantial evidence exists that in practice investors are sluggish, acting as if they face significant costs associated
with taking action (Baker et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2006; Madrian and Shea, 2001) Recent papers have attempted to
characterize optimal decision rules in the presence of both standard fixed costs and information processing costs – see,
for example, Alvarez, Lippi and Paciello (2013), Abel, Eberly and Panageas (2013) and Andersen, Campbell, Nielsen and
Ramadorai (2015).
41In Appendix A.6 (Table A.6.1) we present data on the levels of brokerage commissions and security transactions
taxes, which are the two main forms of monetary transaction costs. We find both of these to be very low, with commissions
ranging from 3 to 9 basis points per trade and security transaction taxes of 14.5 basis points per trade.
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price and the agent’s WTA exceeds the cost of selling, the agent will sell. Given a WTA amount wai jt ,
the agent is less likely to sell as cost c increases. Similarly, a potential buyer with WTP wpi jt will
choose to purchase the stock if wpi jt− c > p jt . Thus, the agent is less likely to buy as cost c increases.
We now apply this framework specifically to lottery winners’ and losers’ choices of whether to
hold, sell, or buy the IPO stock under different assumptions about the costs c that they incur in order
to make a trade.
Case 1: No Costs of Trading. Let j now denote the IPO stock. If we assume that c = 0, a lottery
winner i will choose to hold the IPO stock if wai jt > p jt . A lottery loser i will choose to hold the stock
if wpi jt > p jt . Given that w
a
i jt = w
p
i jt in this model, in this case an investor i will make the same decision
regarding whether to hold the stock regardless of winning or losing the lottery. Furthermore, due to
the randomization in our natural experiment, the distributions of WTA for winners and WTP for losers
will be identical, and the fraction of lottery winners and losers holding the IPO stock will be the same.
Under this assumption, our baseline results (Figure 1), in which we detect a divergence between the
behaviour of 1,561,497 winners and losers (treatment: 468,519, control: 1,092,977), directly arise
from a difference in WTA and WTP between winners and losers.
Case 2: Investor Specific Costs of Trading. Now consider the assumption that costs of trading are
individual specific, i.e., c = ci for an investor i. In this case, a lottery winner i will choose to hold the
IPO stock if wai jt > p jt − ci. A lottery loser i will choose to hold the stock if w
p
i jt > p jt + ci. These
conditions show that the same investor i could potentially make a different decision about whether
to hold the stock based on whether they won or lost the lottery. In particular, any investor whose
valuation satisfies the condition p jt − ci < wai jt = w
p
i jt < p jt + ci will choose to hold the stock as a
lottery winner, but not choose to hold the stock as a lottery loser.
This issue becomes quantitatively less important as we focus on samples of investors with rela-
tively low costs ci. A simple way to identify these investors is to note that the model predicts that
investors with low ci will have high trading volume in all stocks j. To understand this idea better,
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consider a seller in the model who owns N stocks. The total number of stocks Ns that they will sell is:
Ns =
N
∑
j=1
I(p jt−wai jt > ci),
where I(·) is the indicator function. This equation shows that the number of stocks sold corresponds
exactly to those in the investor’s portfolio for which p jt −wai jt > ci. Intuitively, the number of trades
made by an investor is a useful proxy for understanding an investor’s costs ci, since the more sales
investor i makes, the more likely it is that this investor tends to have gaps between the market price
and the agent’s WTA that exceed the cost of selling. Similarly, suppose the investor considers buying
Nb stocks. The number of purchase transactions is:
Nb =
N
∑
j=1
I(wpi jt > p jt + ci)
Again, the model shows that an investor who buys a lot of stocks is the type who has WTP de-
viations above the market price that are generally large relative to their transactions costs. Taken
together, the model shows that by looking at investors who trade more, we are narrowing in on the
types of investors who are on average likelier to have lower costs of trading c.42 Therefore, if investor-
specific costs ci explain the winner-loser divergence in holdings, we would expect the divergence to
approach zero as we look at sub-samples of investors with higher and higher average trading inten-
sity.43
Figure 2a presents separate estimates of the divergence in holding rates of the lottery winners and
losers at the end of the first full month after listing, conditional on making a given number of trades
42We also note here that heterogeneity in trading intensity could also arise from differential needs for liquidity given
the association in the literature between order flow and liquidity trading (see, for example, Grossman and Miller (1988);
Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) and Campbell, Ramadorai and Schwartz (2009)). In the appendix Figure A.1.12 we check
that all the results below hold for investors who are putting net new money into the market (i.e., those unlikely to suffer
from liquidity constraints). We find that our inferences are unaffected by this robustness check, suggesting that c captures
variation in the data over and above heterogeneity in demands for liquidity.
43Another way to evaluate the investor-specific cost story is to consider one simple way that investors could eliminate
this anomalous behavior: lottery winners could always sell the stock after listing. Is it plausible that lottery winners who
hold the stock are a particularly high transaction cost group, and this is what explains why they do not sell sooner? This
does not appear to be the case in the full sample, as 75.2% of lottery winners who sold in the first month also made a
transaction of equal or lesser value than the IPO allotment; similarly, 74% of lottery winners who did not sell made the
same size transaction. Comparing these groups in a regression with IPO share category fixed effects, we find that lottery
winners who sold the IPO stock are 2.1% less likely to have made another small transaction.
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per month, on average, in the six months prior to the lottery. The x-axis represents bins of increasingly
higher numbers of trades, in steps of 2. For example, the black triangle at the zero point on the x-axis
shows, for the group of lottery winners who made less than two trades per month on average in the six
months prior to the lottery, the fraction that hold the IPO stock at the end of the first full month after
listing. Similarly, the green circle corresponds to the fraction of lottery losers with the same pre-IPO
average trading intensity who held the IPO stock at the end of the same month. The black triangle
and green circle at the 20 marker on the x-axis are the corresponding fractions for investors who made
between 20 and 22 trades per month on average in the six months prior to the IPO. The bars indicate
95 % confidence intervals.44 The last estimates at the right-end of the x-axis include investors that
made more than 29 trades per month on average in the six months prior to the IPO. (98.4 % of the
sample made less than 32 trades on average per month, so the points shown in this figure cover the
vast majority of our data.) The figure shows that as we look at sub-samples who have traded larger
amounts, there is some convergence, but there is little suggestion that the effect goes to zero for even
the most frequent traders in the sample.45 It is also interesting to note that the slope of this curve is
essentially flat beyond the five trades per month mark, suggesting little relationship between trading
intensity and the divergence in winner-loser behavior once we move beyond a relatively low trading
intensity threshold.
Figure 3a plots the experiment by experiment winner-loser ownership divergences (in the same
fashion as Figure 1) estimated for a group of 54,678 investors (treatment: 16,545, control: 38,133)
who made an average of 20 trades per month in the 6 months prior to the random allotment. Figure
3a(ii) shows that heavy-trading lottery losers in IPOs with realized returns through the end of the first
month do appear substantially more likely to buy the IPO stock than lottery losers in the full sample,
consistent with our motivation for looking at this sub-sample. Overall, however the figures still show
a clear divergence in the holding behavior of lottery winners and losers.46
44We use the approximation presented in Cochran (1977) to estimate the standard errors of the weighted means.
45In general, we find that portfolio turnover, as measured by the number of trades the investor makes relative to the
number of positions held, increases as the number of trades increases, so these results can also be interpreted as separate
estimates by amount of turnover.
46We conduct the same analysis of holding behavior at the end of the first week after listing relative to trading frequency
in Appendix Figure A.1.8. The results are similar.
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Case 3: Investor-Time Specific Costs of Trading. We next explore the implications of a different
assumption, that c = cit . In this case, we model the costs of trading as investor-time specific. For
example, there may be months where the investor is busy at work, and cit is correspondingly high, but
in other months, she has more time to focus on her stock portfolio. To analyze the importance of this
form of transactions costs, we focus on the sub-sample of investors i at each time t who tended to have
p jt −wai jt > cit for stocks they own, and w
p
i jt > p jt + ci for stocks that they considered purchasing.
Our approach is to identify this sample by inspecting the behavior of lottery winners and losers who
have high trading intensity in the specific month in which we estimate the winner-loser divergence in
holdings of the IPO stock.
Figure 2b estimates the divergence in holdings between lottery winners and losers, based on the
exact number of trades made in the first full month after the IPO lottery.47 Similar to Figure 2a, we
find that the gap between winner and loser holding rates does decline as we focus on applicants who
traded more in the first month, but there is again little suggestion that this divergence is limited to
those who make a small number of trades.48 This result is useful in evaluating the potential for costs
of trading that are related to attention to explain the winner-loser divergence. The investors at the right
side of this figure are paying enough attention to their portfolio to make almost one trade per day on
average in the month of the IPO allotment, so it seems difficult to argue that costs of paying attention
could on their own generate such a large winner-loser divergence in the IPO stock.
Figure 3b plots the experiment by experiment winner-loser ownership rates estimated for a group
of 85,358 investors who made 20 or more trades in the month following random allotment (treatment:
27,216, control: 58,142). Again, the lottery losers in these figures do appear substantially more likely
to purchase the IPO stock relative to the full sample, but the average divergence between winners and
losers is clear in the raw comparison of winner and loser mean holdings.49
47For example, the black triangle (green circle) at the 20 mark on the x-axis is the fraction of winners (losers) who
held the stock and made exactly 20 trades in non-IPO stocks in the first full month after listing. This figure covers over 98
percent of the sample.
48The number of trades made in the first full month after the IPO are potentially affected by whether the applicant wins
the lottery. Anagol et. al. (2015) find that lottery winners are slightly more likely to trade in the month after listing, but
the economic magnitude of these effects are very small.
49Appendix Table A.1.5 estimates the divergence by trading intensity over the first six months after listing, and finds
the pattern of decline is similar to the full sample.
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Case 4: Investor-Time-Security Specific Costs of Trading. The final possibility that we consider is
that the costs of trading are specific to investors at particular times and pertain to particular types of
positions within their portfolios. For example, some investors might find that the costs of initiating
a trade in the IPO security are too high because the size of the position may be too small to warrant
attention. To consider this possibility, we condition on a set of investors who recently traded in sizes
less than or equal to the size of the IPO allotment.50
Figure 2c separately estimates the divergences for applicants who made the number of trades
(specified on the x-axis) of sizes less than or equal to the size of the IPO allotment. Again, we find
the divergence reduces as we look at more active investors, but remains economically and statistically
significant for even the most active investors. Figure 3c plots the winner loser ownership divergences
estimated for the group of 36,467 investors who made at least 20 trades of sizes less than or equal to
the size of the IPO allotment amount in the month following random allotment (treatment: 13,235,
control: 23,232). Again, we find lottery losers appear more likely to purchase the stock in more active
samples, but the divergences in the raw data continue to be clear.51
To further investigate the importance of investor-time-security transactions costs, we focus even
further on sub-samples of investors that sold, in the month of analysis, another IPO allotment. In
Appendix Table A.1.7 we estimate the divergence for the sub-sample of investors who were allotted
at least one other IPO in the past six months prior to the current IPO, and chose to sell at least one
of these previously allotted IPO stocks in the month in which we estimate the divergence for the
treatment IPO. For example, in Column (2) of this table, 21,113 investors in the sample actively sold
another IPO allotment that they received in the past six months. The divergence in holdings between
the lottery winners and losers in this sub-sample remains large and statistically significant.52 It seems
difficult to argue that transactions costs for selling IPO stocks are high for this sub-sample, as we
50For example, suppose IPO A allotted lottery winners 150 dollars worth of shares. In this case, we check the preva-
lence of winner-loser divergences only for those investors who made at least one purchase of size (in a non-IPO stock)
less than 150 dollars, made at least one sale less than 150 dollars, or met both these criteria in the month following the
random allotment.
51Appendix Tables A.1.6 shows these divergences over the first six months for investors who made at least one trade
in a position less than the IPO allotment value. The pattern of decline is similar to that in the full sample.
52The fact that these differences are smaller may also reflect that this sub-sample has a smaller endowment effect, as
naturally those investors who sell IPO allotments as winners are the types with lower endowment effects.
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explicitly condition on having sold an allotted IPO stock. It also seems difficult to argue that these
investors never actively thought about selling their IPO stock, as they actively sell another IPO stock
in exactly the same month.
We next test whether the winner-loser divergence decreases with Google search intensity regarding
the IPO, which prior work has used as a proxy for attention (Choi and Varian, 2012; Da et al., 2011).
The Search Volume Index (SVI), which ranges between 0 and 100, measures monthly search interest
as the total number of queries for keywords related to a particular IPO, relative to the highest search
interest in that IPO over our sample period. A value of 100 denotes the highest point of interest during
our sample. We obtain the SVI for each IPO using the firm’s name and ISIN as keywords. Although
the SVI is not useful to measure absolute volumes for searches, it gauges interest and mindshare
in a given month relative to the month with the highest search interest during our sample. We first
sort the investors in our sample by trading activity (as above), and then based on the quartile break-
points of the SVI for the corresponding IPO in each event-time month. While we refer the interested
reader to the Appendix Figure A.1.10 for details, we note here that the winner-loser divergence is the
lowest for IPOs in the high search volume group in months two, three, and six months after listing,
although the relationship between the treatment effect and Google search intensity is not monotonic.
Overall, this analysis provides suggestive evidence that when IPOs receive more attention, there is a
smaller winner-loser divergence, consistent with the arguments in Odean (1999). However, we find
that the differences between high and low search intensity months are relatively small, suggesting that
attention is unlikely to be the only driver of our results.
Finally, an important prediction of our model of costs associated with trading is that winners
should be just as likely to purchase additional stock on the secondary market as lottery losers are
to purchase the stock on the secondary market. This is because in this comparison, because of the
randomization, both winners and losers pay the same cost to purchase these (additional shares) of
the stock. In Table 4 we test whether lottery winners are more likely to purchase the IPO stock
on the open market after it lists, compared to the propensity of lottery losers to do so. Panel A
shows results for the full sample. In the month of listing, we find that lottery winners are 0.6% more
likely to purchase the stock on the open market than lottery losers are to purchase the stock at all.
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The size of this effect declines in the months after listing, although even six months after listing,
the probability that lottery winners purchase the IPO stock again is twice that of lottery losers, and
significant at the 1% level. When we look at sub-samples of traders with lower costs of trading (as per
our model above), this effect is even larger, with lottery winners being approximately 3 percentage
points more likely to buy the IPO stock than lottery losers in the listing month, regardless of the
measure used.53 It is difficult to see how inertia based purely on the costs of trading can be reconciled
with lottery winners who more actively buy the stock on the open market than lottery losers, given
that under this explanation, randomization induces equal WTP/WTA distributions and costs across
groups. In contrast, the endowment effect is a more natural explanation for this, as randomly owning
the stock raises the average WTP for the stock.54 In related work we also find that lottery winners are
more likely to trade non-IPO stocks in their portfolio than lottery losers, suggesting that, if anything,
winning the lottery reduces costs associated with making a trade (Anagol et al., 2015).
Overall, we conclude that costs associated with initiating a transaction are unlikely to be the
principal driver of the effects that we detect.
The Relationship Between the Winner-Loser Divergence and Experience. List (2003) and List
(2011) document substantial reductions in the endowment effect when measured for more experienced
market participants in field experiments, raising the possibility that the WTA/WTP divergences we
detect may arise from inexperienced market participants.
We therefore document how differential holding patterns in the I~PO stock vary with plausible
proxies of investors’ experience in the IPO market. To do so, we interact our main “winner” indicator
variable in equation (1) with a set of predetermined variables that we believe are useful proxies for
experience in the IPO market. This is a descriptive analysis similar to that conducted in List (2003).
Table 5 presents the results of this exercise for the full sample of winner and loser investors, as well
as for the samples of “non-inertial” investors (i.e., those with high trading intensity) identified earlier.
53This is an approximately 40% higher proportion of buying the IPO stock relative to the 7 to 8 percent of lottery losers
that purchase the IPO stock in these active trading samples.
54Appendix Figure A.1.11 shows a graphical comparison of propensity to purchase additional shares of the IPO stock,
splitting the sample by positive and negative listing gain IPOs. We find winners are more likely to purchase additional
shares for both positive and negative listing gain IPOs, although the results are noisy for negative listing gain IPOs due to
the smaller sample size.
28
Column (1) in Table 5 takes equation (1), and adds a set of interactions between the “winner”
indicator, and categorical variables based on tercile or quartile breakpoints of the proxies for investor
experience that are listed in the rows. Columns (2), (3), and (4) conduct the same regression, but
for the smaller samples of investors identified in our previous discussion of inertia (corresponding,
respectively, to ci, cit , ci jt). Our discussion below mainly focuses on Column (1), but we note here
that estimated coefficients are similarly signed across all proxies of experiences in the four samples,
with some differences arising in statistical significance on account of inevitable reductions in sample
size.
The first set of rows show that the estimated endowment effect is highly correlated with the number
of IPOs that the winner had been allotted in the past. Accounts which received over 8 (random and
nonrandom) allotments in the past have estimated endowment effects that are 17 percentage points
smaller than investors with no past IPO experience. However, relative to the base rate listed in the
very first row (77.9%), even such “experienced” IPO allottees are 60% more likely to hold the IPO
stock at the end of the first month. Similarly, the next set of rows show that experience measured
by trading activity also reduces the observed endowment effect. Winners with more than 6 trades in
the month before IPO allotment are 14.3% less likely to hold the IPO stock compared to those with
no past trades. Moreover, high numbers of trades are also associated with greater buying activity by
lottery losers.
We then measure past return experience by constructing the fraction of realized returns in the
preceding six months to the IPO allotment that is greater than the listing return observed in the IPO.
We find that if the returns on the treatment IPO are substantially greater than most previously expe-
rienced returns, the endowment effect reduces considerably. Interestingly, the reverse seems to be
true for the control group – they appear to have a higher propensity to hold IPOs which have higher
listing returns than most they have ever experienced, and vice versa. These effects appear to become
far stronger for the group of “non-inertial” investors in columns (2), (3), and (4), especially when
explaining winners’ propensities to trade the IPO stock.55 Figure 1 (c) suggests that some version of
55Appendix Tables A.1.8 and A.1.9 present this analysis at the end of the first full month and first full week after
listing, respectively, and find similar results.
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the disposition effect may be in operation for lottery winners, and this finding on the role of the past
return experiences of lottery winners and losers in explaining their propensity to hold or buy suggests
an intriguing link between the observed disposition effect and the salience of returns as measured by
their rank in investors’ past experiences. This appears connected to the predictions of “warm glow”
models (Morewedge et al., 2009; Bordalo et al., 2012).56
In Appendix Section A.5 we use the randomized allocation of recent lotteries to more rigorously
test whether recent experiences with winning an IPO lottery cause the estimated divergence in hold-
ings generated by subsequent random allotments to be lower. We find that recent lottery winners show
smaller divergences in holdings, but that these differences are slight.
Overall, these results suggest that there is a correlation between measures of investor experience
and smaller endowment effects, consistent with the findings in List (2003).57 However, having expe-
rienced many allotments in the past does not appear to lead to quick and complete elimination of the
endowment anomaly in this setting.
Advantages of the IPO Lottery Experiment for Studying Endowment Effects. We have discussed
above several potential confounds in our field experiment that could generate other causes for our
results other than the endowment effect. It is also worth highlighting that our natural experiment
also has a few identification advantages, in addition to such potential confounds. The setting that we
consider avoids four specific laboratory features that have been highlighted as spuriously producing
endowment effects in Plott and Zeiler (2005), namely: 1) the endowed object is placed physically in
front of the subject, and therefore endowed subjects might gain more information about the endowed
versus non-endowed object,58 2) the endowed object is called a gift, or may be interpreted as a gift,
3) the procedure measuring WTA and WTP is not properly incentivized, and 4) the subject is not
guaranteed anonymity when making choices. In our setting, 1) lottery winners do not have access
56Table A.1.10 shows that the winning investors have a higher holding propensity in the IPO stocks, even conditional
on returns, than they do in other stocks that they purchased. While this analysis is not causal, it also lends support to the
possibility that there may be an additional “warm glow” operating for IPO stocks.
57In Appendix Table A.1.3. we present a comparison of the effect sizes in our natural experiment to previously run
field and lab exchange experiments. For low experience samples are results are similar, but for high experience samples
we find substantially higher endowment effects.
58For example, in List (2003), sports cards traders were physically given the sports memorabilia, asked to fill out a
survey, and then prompted for whether they want to trade.
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to any information about the IPO security that lottery losers cannot obtain through publicly available
sources, 2) there is little reason to believe winners would frame receiving the IPO stock as a gift given
that they put down large escrow amounts to apply for the shares, and have to pay the issue price, 3)
we measure the endowment effect by measuring the actual divergence in holdings of the IPO stock,
which investors are clearly incentivized to choose optimally, and 4) the anonymous nature of financial
markets makes it unlikely that investors are concerned about others observing their choices.
Three other advantages of our setting are worth noting. First, participants in our setting have a
far longer time period to consider their potential decisions regarding the endowed gamble, including
the period before the allotment (when they could make a plan regarding what to do in the event of
winning or losing the lottery); the period immediately following the allotment; and the many months
when we can track their behavior after the stock starts trading. For example, it would be easy for
lottery applicants to avoid the endowment effect in our setting by making a plan to sell the stock
immediately after it lists if they win the lottery, and to not buy the stock if they lose the lottery. In
contrast, subjects in exchange experiments typically consider these choices for much shorter periods
of time. For example, in the List (2003) study, subjects were given a piece of sports memorabilia
by the experimenter, took a five minute survey, and then were immediately asked if they would like
to trade for another piece of sports memorabilia. Second, our participants have many more learning
opportunities to exploit during this longer time period (such as peers, message boards, broker advice,
etc.) that subjects in the previous field and lab experiments do not have access to. In this sense our
results can be viewed as a joint test of the hypothesis that individual market participants demonstrate
an endowment effect, and also that market sources of information do not eliminate this anomaly.
Third, because we observe the investor’s full portfolio of trades, we can observe whether the investor
actively chooses to buy more of the randomly endowed gamble, in addition to whether they hold the
randomly endowed gamble. This is a useful direct test that most laboratory and field experiments do
not permit.
We next turn to considering whether the leading class of models that have been used to explain the
endowment effect, namely, reference dependent preferences models, can explain our field experiment
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results.59
4 Endowment Effect Inspired Theoretical Explanations
In this section, we consider prominent theoretical explanations of endowment effects which involve
WTA/WTP gaps arising as a direct consequence of ownership. The literature has focused on one main
class of theories, namely reference-dependent preferences with different formulations of reference
points. We therefore concentrate on these models in our analysis. Our aims are to: 1) determine the
extent to which these models can generate a WTA-WTP gap when set up and solved in environments
approximating our real-world setting, and 2) derive additional testable predictions generated by these
models to see whether they hold up in the data.
1. Issue Price as the Reference Price. The first model that we consider is one in which reference
prices are fixed. A recent, useful theoretical formulation of how this can generate endowment effects
in general is provided by Weaver and Frederick (2012). In their framework, consumers’ valuations
of objects can be distorted by how the market price of a good relates to a (given) reference price.
Weaver and Frederick (2012) term this an “aversion to bad deals.” To apply this model to our setting,
we can think of lottery losers who focus on the issue price as the reference price. According to the
theory, such losing investors would see purchasing the stock after the IPO as a bad deal because the
stock typically trades higher than the issue price even though the issue price is irrelevant for the future
performance of the stock. We relegate the formal presentation of the model of Weaver and Frederick
(2012) applied to our setting in the appendix, but summarize the main results of the model here.
The model can generate an endowment effect because lottery losers’ valuations of the stock are
distorted downwards due to their disutility from having to pay a price higher than the issue price.
However, this distortion does not occur for lottery winners because they already own the stock, and
therefore do not have to transact at the listing price to add it to their portfolio. In addition to predicting
an endowment effect, the model also predicts that the endowment effect should fall in the size of the
59Our appendix also presents evidence on a series of non-reference dependent mechanisms, including information
acquisition costs, lottery losers purchasing a substitute stock, households submitting multiple applications, wealth effects,
disincentives for flipping, tax motivated behavior, the possibility that losing the lottery generates ill-feelings about the
specific stock amongst losing investors, all as possible explanations for our estimated endowment effects. Overall, none
of these factors appears to fully explain the winner-loser divergence we observe.
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listing gain on the stock. The intuition for this result is that as the listing gain gets smaller, lottery
losers have the opportunity to buy the stock at a price closer and closer to the price that lottery winners
paid. The motivation for lottery losers to feel like they are getting a “bad deal” when they purchase
the stock in the aftermarket therefore declines as the listing gain decreases.
We find mixed evidence for this prediction. On the day of listing, we find in the full sample (Figure
1 Panels (a) and (b)) as well as in highly active trading samples (Figure 2, (i) figures), that there is little
evidence of a relationship between the size of the listing gain and the endowment effect. However,
when we look at the end of the first full month of trading, the tendency of lottery losers to hold the
stock does decline as the absolute value of the return on the IPO stock increases. These results provide
some support for the endowment effect that we observe being driven by lottery winners’ and losers’
valuations for the stock being influenced by different reference prices.
Another prediction of this model is that as the IPO stock price approaches the issue price over
time, we should see the endowment effect go down as lottery losers become more willing to purchase
the stock (assuming the reference price remains the issue price over time). In Table 4, we find that by
the end of the second month after the IPO, the mean return on the IPO stocks in our sample is minus
one percent relative to the issue price. Thus, if the main reason lottery losers choose not to purchase
the IPO stock is because of an aversion to paying a price higher than the issue price, we should see
much more buying three months after the IPO (on average). The data shows, however, that only 1.5%
of lottery losers choose to own the IPO stock even when it has essentially returned back to the issue
price, which is inconsistent with the sole explanation for the endowment effect being based on losers
feeling that they are engaging in “bad deals” relative to the issue price.
An additional challenge for this model is that it does not predict that lottery winners should be
more likely to buy the stock actively on the market than lottery losers. The intuition is that, in this
model, when winners think about buying more of the IPO stock, they should also have downwardly
distorted valuations of the stock in the same way that lottery losers’ valuations are distorted. Another
ingredient must therefore be added to this framework to generate the prediction of winners actively
purchasing more on the market.60
60A previous version of this paper included a simple version of a realization utility based model with loss aversion.
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2. Expectations as Reference Points – Expected Distribution of Prices. Within the reference-
dependent preferences framework, an alternative potential reference point agents might have is own-
ership of the stock evaluated using the expected distribution of future prices of the IPO stock, rather
than comparing the current price to a fixed reference price. In such a setup, the expectations based
reference point theory of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) predicts an “endowment effect for risk.” Decision
makers will be less risk-averse when the reference point is stochastic and they face the choice of a
constant alternative, and more risk averse when the reference point is fixed and they face the choice of
a stochastic alternative. The fact that lottery winners take greater risk by continuing to hold the IPO
stock, while lottery losers choose not to purchase the IPO stock appears consistent with this prediction
of the model, under this formulation of reference points.61,62
In the appendix we present a model in which lottery participants have expectations based stochas-
tic reference points. In the model, reference points are determined by expectations, which in turn
are determined by the lottery participant’s plan of action (which is chosen prior to the stock listing).
Lottery losers consider two possible plans; one where they do not buy the IPO stock after it lists, and
In that model the endowment effect resulted because lottery winners had a potential realization utility gain due to the
listing gain, while lottery losers did not. On the margin, this made lottery winners more willing to hold the IPO stock than
lottery losers. This model made the same prediction as “bad deals” model, in that the winner-loser divergence in holdings
should increase as we look at larger and larger listing gains. It is also worth noting that a more sophisticated version of
the realization utility model with either diminishing sensitivity or time discounting, as in Barberis and Xiong (2012) and
Ingersoll and Jin (2013) would yield a disposition effect for winners, i.e., that the selling propensity would increase in the
strength of holding period returns.
61Sprenger (2015) and Song (2015) both present laboratory evidence confirming this prediction of the KR theory. Note
that neither standard expected utility theory nor disappointment aversion (another leading theory of reference point deter-
mination where the reference point is based on the certainty equivalent of a gamble), predict this so called “endowment
effect for risk.” In addition, previous laboratory research has found that subjects’ risk aversion decreases regarding a given
lottery depending on whether they are initially endowed with the lottery (see Sprenger (2015) for a detailed summary).
For example, Knetsch and Sinden (1984) and Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) find higher WTA than WTP for gambles,
and survey estimates of risk-aversion are sensitive to whether the subject is endowed with the risk and trading for a sure
amount or vice-versa (Schoemaker, 1990).
62Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) present a theory where recently formed expectations about future outcomes determine an
agent’s reference points. In the case of exchange experiments, one simple prediction is that subjects might expect to not
have the opportunity to trade the endowed good, and so ownership of the good is the relevant recently-formed reference
point. Relative to this reference point, the option of trading the good away is encoded as a loss, and subjects thus tend to
hold endowed objects more than would be predicted by standard expected utility preferences. In our stock market setting,
however, investors almost surely enter the lottery assuming that the stock price will vary in the aftermarket, meaning that
models of reference points geared towards lotteries are likely to be more realistic characterizations of our setting.
An additional issue here is that investors in our setting very likely also enter the lottery with the expectation that they
will be able to trade the stock after it is listed, given that these stocks are traded on the exchange daily. The idea that
winners tend to hold the stock because they expect to own the stock in the future, discounting heavily that they will have
the option to trade, is less plausible. This also means that the endowment effect cannot be a preferred personal equilibrium
(PPE) when applying this model in our setting.
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one where they do buy the stock. Similarly, lottery winners consider a plan to sell the stock versus a
plan to hold the stock. We find that that there is a range of parameters regarding the future success of
the stock for which the “endowment effect plan,” i.e., to hold the stock if the agent wins, and not buy
the stock if the agent loses the lottery is a personal equilibrium (PE) in the language of Kőszegi and
Rabin (2006). The main intuition for this result is the same as in Sprenger (2015), namely that agents
demonstrate an “endowment effect for risk” – they exhibit lower risk aversion when endowed with a
gamble and consider trading it for cash, than when they are endowed with cash and consider trading
it for a gamble.
The range of parameters that can deliver the result, however, is quite narrow relative to the actual
pattern of experienced IPO returns. If the expected return is too high (low), the model predicts that
losers will buy the IPO stock (winners will sell), eliminating any endowment effect. In particular, the
probability of the up state has to be high enough so that the agent sticks to holding the stock when
they win, but simultaneously has to be low enough so that the agent also sticks to holding cash if they
lose the lottery. A second challenge for this model is that the endowment effect plan is only a PE, and
not a preferred personal equilibrium (PPE), which is an equilibrium refinement of Kőszegi and Rabin
(2006). In practice, this means that while under PE parameters the agent does not want to deviate
from the endowment effect plan, from an ex-ante perspective the agent would gain higher utility from
changing their plan to make a consistent holding decision on the IPO stock regardless of winning or
losing the lottery.63 A third challenge to this framework is that, because the mechanism works through
the agent’s risk-aversion, it does not predict that lottery winners should actively purchase more of the
IPO stock. A final challenge is that for the expectations based reference point model to generate
the endowment effect we need to assume that the investor narrowly frames their IPO stock choices
separately from their portfolio. Absent this narrow-framing assumption, we would predict that lottery
winners, because they are randomly endowed with more risk, should increase their risk-taking overall,
not just in the IPO stock. In Anagol, Balasubramaniam and Ramadorai (2015) however, we find that
63The PE condition satisfied by these parameter values only guarantees that the agent does not wish to deviate from
the endowment effect plan. However, it does not guarantee that pursuing this plan delivers the agent the highest expected
utility of all possible plans. When we derive these conditions (for a “preferred personal equilibrium” or PPE (Kőszegi
and Rabin (2006))), as in Sprenger (2015), we confirm that there is no endowment effect for risk. See the Appendix for
more details on why the endowment effect plan is not a PPE in our setting.
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lottery winners do not allocate more money to the stock market. The total allocation to the market is
one measure of risk-taking, and on this measure, the results are inconsistent with the broader model’s
prediction on risk-taking.64
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In the absence of wealth effects or transactions costs, standard economic theories predict a fundamen-
tal symmetry: the same person should not make different decisions about whether to hold a gamble
depending on whether he or she is endowed with the gamble. Data on the behavior of applicants
to Indian IPO lotteries refutes this prediction. We find that randomly receiving shares in an IPO in-
creases the probability that an applicant holds these shares for many months after the allotment, and
that standard factors such as transaction costs, wealth effects, and taxes are unlikely to explain these
effects.
We explore the extent to which reference-dependent preferences, the leading explanation for lab-
oratory endowment effects, can rationalize our empirical findings. These models differ in the precise
formulation of the reference point around which agents evaluate their gain-loss utility. Overall, we
conclude that neither a model in which the issue price is a fixed reference point, nor expectations-
based formulations in which the expected distribution of prices serves as the (stochastic) reference
point can explain our findings on their own.
While we face data-based limitations on our ability to test alternative theories of the endowment
effect, one potentially promising avenue is that receiving an endowment causes an agent’s attention to
shift toward its more positive attributes (i.e., “warm glow” based explanations).65 Bordalo, Gennaioli
and Shleifer (2012) present a formal theory of the endowment effect based on a similar mechanism,
64In Appendix B, we present a model of an agent with expectations based reference dependent preferences who has
chosen to enter the lottery for an IPO stock, experiences a listing gain, and decides on a plan of action based on whether or
not she wins the lottery, as well as on how the stock performs in the aftermarket. This model also delivers a narrow range
of parameters that can make the endowment effect plan an equilibrium. In particular, the observed pattern of negative
returns on IPOs is outside of this restricted set of beliefs.
65Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert and Wilson (2009) present laboratory evidence for such a mechanism, arguing that owner-
ship of a good makes the positive aspects of the good salient, and therefore leads to an exchange asymmetry. Their key
experiment was to endow all subjects with a mug, and then randomly choose some subjects to state their WTA for the
mug, and some subjects to state their WTP for a second mug. They find no WTA-WTP gap in this comparison, suggesting
that once an object is owned the subject focuses on positive features of the mug.
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namely that ownership causes subjects to focus on the positive aspects of the owned good, and there-
fore makes them less likely to trade. In our setting, this model would suggest that lottery winners
initially focus on the IPO stock’s best characteristics when they compare it to the possibility of get-
ting no shares in the lottery. This focus causes the IPO winner to over-value the stock when they
contemplate selling it later, which in turn results in them holding the stock at higher rates than lottery
losers.
The warm-glow approach is promising, as it appears able to rationalize at least two facts that
are difficult to explain with reference-dependent preference-based accounts of the endowment effect.
First, the warm glow account can explain why lottery winners have a greater tendency to actively buy
the IPO stock on the secondary market when compared to lottery losers, but simultaneously do not
have a greater tendency to actively buy other stocks in greater quantities. According to the warm-
glow based explanations, winners will tend to focus on the positive aspects of the IPO stock that they
own, and will therefore also see purchasing more of that specific stock as a good idea. In contrast,
reference-dependent models can explain the increased purchase of all risky assets, but cannot (without
auxiliary assumptions) explain specific additional purchases of the IPO stock.
Second, it is difficult for the reference-dependent theories to explain why agents would hold the
IPO stock despite significant evidence that IPOs on average have highly negative returns - since these
models require that agents have “medium-sized” expectations about returns on the IPO stock to gen-
erate an endowment effect. In contrast, since the warm glow explanation posits that agents focus on
specific positive aspects of goods, it can also potentially explain the high holding rates of winners in
the face of negative evidence on historical IPO returns.
The potential for warm glow explanations to explain our findings also highlights what we learn
from the failure of reference dependent preferences-based explanations for our findings. In all reference-
dependent preference-based explanations, being endowed with an object does not change the agent’s
perception of the object itself; instead, it influences valuation only when the agent considers selling the
object (i.e., through the pain of losing the object or through effects on risk-aversion as in the endow-
ment effect for risk-based explanations). Our results suggest instead that we should seek to understand
how ownership changes perceptions of the specific object being owned, and how such changed percep-
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tions might distort owners’ valuations directly, rather than through the lens of reference-comparison-
based considerations.
Overall, our results suggest that endowment type effects may have important in-the-field impli-
cations for asset markets, in addition to the consumer (mugs, pens) and durable goods (sports cards,
collectors pins) markets where they have most commonly been studied. Although our field context
does not allow us to definitively determine which models best explain our evidence, exploring the
empirical validity (in other settings) and general equilibrium implications of this type of buyer/seller
divergence appears to be a fruitful area for future research.
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Figure 1: Proportion of Investors Holding IPO Stock and Returns Experience
(a) Listing Returns (%) (b) Listing Gain (USD)
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(c) Holding Returns at End of First Full Month After Listing (%) (d) Holding Gain at End of First Full Month After Listing (USD)
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Panels (a) and (b) present estimates at the end of the first day on the y-axis and Panels (c) and (d) present estimates at the end of the first full month on the y-axis.
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Figure 2: Winner-Loser Divergence by Trading Activity
(a) i: By average number of trades per month in six months before IPO allotment
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(b) i, t: By number of trades in first full month after listing
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(c) i, j, t: By number of trades whose size ≤ IPO allotment size in first full month after listing
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Note: The 95% confidence interval are constructed using standard errors for weighted mean as in Cochran (1977).
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Figure 3: IPO Stock Holding Rates at End of Listing Day Against Listing Returns
Panel A: Investors with > 20 trades per month on average in six months before lottery
(i) Lottery Winners (ii) Lottery Losers
Endowment effect estimate: 0.617∗∗∗
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Panel B: Investors with > 20 trades in first full month after allotment
(i) Lottery Winners (ii) Lottery Losers
Endowment effect estimate: 0.588∗∗∗
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Panel C: Investors with at least 20 trades <= IPO allotment size in first full month after allotment
(i) Lottery Winners (ii) Lottery Losers
Endowment effect estimate: 0.747∗∗∗
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Figure 4: IPO Stock Holding Rates at End of First Full Month After Listing Against Returns
Panel A: Investors with > 20 trades per month on average in six months before lottery
(i) Lottery Winners (ii) Lottery Losers
Endowment effect estimate: 0.427∗∗∗
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Panel B: Investors with > 20 trades in first full month after allotment
(i) Lottery Winners (ii) Lottery Losers
Endowment effect estimate: 0.356∗∗∗
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Panel C: Investors with at least 20 trades <= IPO allotment size in first full month after allotment
(i) Lottery Winners (ii) Lottery Losers
Endowment effect estimate: 0.430∗∗∗
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Figure 5: Winners’ propensity to hold and losers’ propensity to buy
(a) Losers’ propensity to buy matched stock
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(b) Winners’ propensity to hold
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Table 1: RANDOMIZATION CHECK
Winner Loser Difference % Experiments
Mean Mean > 10% significance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Applied/Allotted an IPO 0.379 0.379 0.000 8.97
Cutoff Bid 0.926 0.925 0.001 10.96
Gross No. of Transactions
No. of Transactions > 0 0.682 0.683 -0.001 9.66
No. of Transactions = 1 to 5 0.449 0.451 -0.002 8.35
No. of Transactions = 6 to 10 0.116 0.115 0.000 11.22
No. of Transactions = 11 to 20 0.070 0.069 0.000 8.87
No. of Transactions > 20 0.048 0.047 0.000 9.92
Gross No. of Transactions ≤ IPO Allotment Value
No. of Transactions > 0 0.635 0.618 0.017 5.48
No. of Transactions = 1 to 5 0.477 0.483 -0.006 7.83
No. of Transactions = 6 to 10 0.087 0.077 0.011 7.66
No. of Transactions = 11 to 20 0.047 0.041 0.006 23.24
No. of Transactions > 20 0.025 0.019 0.007 34.46
IHS Portfolio Value 6.673 6.667 0.006 13.05
Portfolio Value = 0 0.214 0.215 0.000 10.18
Portfolio Value = 0 to 500$ 0.129 0.129 0.000 12.94
Portfolio Value = 500 to 1000$ 0.087 0.087 0.000 10.18
Portfolio Value = 1000 to 5000$ 0.317 0.317 0.000 8.09
Portfolio Value > 5000$ 0.252 0.252 0.000 9.39
Flipper 0.287 0.286 0.001 13.21
No. of Securities Held 9.091 9.013 0.077** 10.96
IHS Account Age 3.148 3.143 0.005* 12.53
New Account 0.055 0.055 0.000 5.74
1 Month old 0.067 0.067 0.000 9.14
2-6 Months old 0.191 0.192 -0.001 8.87
7-13 Months old 0.141 0.141 0.000 8.87
14-25 Months old 0.167 0.167 0.000 9.92
> 25 Months old 0.375 0.373 0.002** 12.01
N = 1,561,497. All variables are measured one month prior to the lottery allotment. *,**,*** denote significance at the
10, 5 and 1 percent levels. The flipper dummy takes the value 1 if the account had ever received an IPO and sold it in the
month of receiving it.
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Table 2: CHARACTERIZING LOTTERY APPLICATION AND ALLOTMENT EXPERIENCE
Treatment Characteristics Percentile Across Experiments
Mean 10 20 50 75 90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Application Amount ($) 1,750 155 343 791 1,397 2,093
Probability of Treatment 0.36 0.09 0.20 0.37 0.64 0.84
Allotment Value ($) 150 125 130 142 158 169
First Day Gain/Loss (%) 39.18 -7.57 6.10 17.13 37.08 87.77
First Day Gain/Loss ($) 61.89 -11.14 8.49 24.78 53.03 136.94
Median Portfolio Value (t-2,$) 1,748 722 1,088 1,594 2,270 2,999
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Table 3: EFFECT OF WINNING IPO LOTTERY ON OWNERSHIP OF IPO STOCK
Listing Months Since Listing
Dependent Variable: Day 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
I(Holds IPO Stock) ȳw 0.700 0.624 0.542 0.519 0.497 0.484 0.474 0.466
ȳl 0.007 0.010 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016
ρ 0.693*** 0.613*** 0.527*** 0.503*** 0.482*** 0.468*** 0.458*** 0.449***
Fraction of Allotment ȳw 0.645 0.576 0.562 0.543 0.533 0.529 0.522
ȳl 0.044 0.058 0.061 0.061 0.064 0.065 0.065
ρ 0.601*** 0.518*** 0.501*** 0.481*** 0.470*** 0.464*** 0.457***
I(Holds Exactly IPO Allotment) ȳw 0.587 0.501 0.477 0.456 0.442 0.432 0.423
ȳl 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
ρ 0.586*** 0.499*** 0.475*** 0.454*** 0.440*** 0.429*** 0.420***
Value of IPO Shares Held (USD) ȳw 108.818 84.037 72.500 70.226 59.546 53.168 54.717
ȳl 7.232 8.197 7.767 7.995 7.621 7.004 7.418
ρ 101.582*** 75.835*** 64.727*** 62.230*** 51.927*** 46.164*** 47.296***
Portfolio Weight of IPO Stock ȳw 0.133 0.093 0.080 0.077 0.070 0.064 0.064
ȳl 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
ρ 0.132*** 0.091*** 0.079*** 0.075*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.063***
Mean Listing Return 42
Mean Return Over Issue Price 19 6 - 1 2 - 5 - 6 - 6
Mean Return Over Listing Price -15 -24 -29 -27 -31 -33 -33
Mean Market Return 2 4 3 1 8 10 9
The sample size is 1,561,497 accounts in each month. *,**,*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. ȳw denotes the winner group average, ȳl , the loser
group average and ρ the coefficient estimated from equation 1. Market returns are computed over the holding period and obtained from http://www.iimahd.ernet.
in/~iffm/Indian-Fama-French-Momentum/DATA/20160831_FourFactors_and_Market_Returns_Monthly.csv.
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Table 4: PROPENSITY TO BUY ADDITIONAL QUANTITY OF IPO STOCK
Months Since Listing
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: Full Sample
I(Buy IPO Stock) ȳw 0.0166 0.0098 0.0065 0.0047 0.0038 0.0051 0.0041
ȳl 0.0110 0.0055 0.0030 0.0021 0.0014 0.0020 0.0017
ρ 0.0055*** 0.0043*** 0.0035*** 0.0026*** 0.0023*** 0.0031*** 0.0024***
Panel B: Investors ≥ Average 20 Trades in Six Months Prior to IPO Allotment
I(Buy IPO Stock) ȳw 0.094 0.055 0.035 0.029 0.023 0.027 0.022
ȳl 0.067 0.037 0.025 0.018 0.013 0.015 0.013
ρ 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.008***
Panel C: Investors ≥ Trades in Current Month
I(Buy IPO Stock) ȳw 0.106 0.079 0.064 0.051 0.040 0.051 0.046
ȳl 0.077 0.064 0.045 0.032 0.026 0.033 0.032
ρ 0.029*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.014***
Panel D: Investors ≥ 20 Trades of ≤ Size to IPO Allotment
I(Buy IPO Stock) ȳw 0.108 0.058 0.039 0.033 0.025 0.031 0.025
ȳl 0.080 0.039 0.029 0.020 0.014 0.019 0.016
ρ 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.009***
The sample sizes in panels A,B,C, and D are 1,561,497, 54,678, 85,358, 36,467 respectively. *,**,*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1
percent levels. ȳw denotes the winner group average, ȳl , the loser group average and ρ the coefficient estimated from equation 1.
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Table 5: HETEROGENEOUS FIRST-DAY WINNER EFFECTS BY PRE-EXISTING ACCOUNT
CHARACTERISTICS
Dependent Variable: First Day I(IPO Stock Held) Full Sample i i, t i, j, t
All trades (Small trades)
(Avg. 6 mnths) (Month after allotment) (Month after allotment)
Winner 0.779*** 0.562*** 0.745*** 0.782***
# of IPOs Allotted
1 to 2 IPOs 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
3 to 8 IPOs 0.003** -0.005 -0.001 -0.003
> 8 IPOs 0.009*** -0.002 0.009*** 0.003
Winner ×
# of IPOs Allotted
1 to 2 IPOs -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.027*** -0.036***
3 to 8 IPOs -0.095*** -0.054*** -0.043*** -0.038***
> 8 IPOs -0.165*** -0.098*** -0.094*** -0.064***
# of Trades Made
1 to 2 trades 0.002*** 0.000 0.008 0.006
3 to 6 trades 0.001*** 0.005 0.018*** 0.012
> 6 trades 0.010*** 0.011 0.012** 0.032***
Winner ×
# of Trades Made
1 to 2 trades -0.031*** -0.140 -0.057*** -0.006
3 to 6 trades -0.096*** -0.026 -0.153*** -0.072
> 6 trades -0.143*** -0.122 -0.119*** -0.140***
Fraction Past Returns > Listing Returns
0.01 to 0.15 0.008*** 0.001 -0.002 0.008
0.16 to 0.50 -0.007*** -0.002 -0.009*** -0.008
> 0.50 -0.017*** 0.001 -0.027*** -0.026***
Winner ×
Fraction Past Returns > Listing Returns
0.01 to 0.15 -0.100*** -0.008 -0.018* -0.076***
0.16 to 0.50 -0.047*** 0.060*** 0.025** -0.021
> 0.50 0.018*** 0.166*** 0.133*** 0.080***
Winner ×
Listing Returns (%)
<= 0 -0.217*** -0.310*** -0.295*** -0.342***
26 to 41 percent -0.053*** -0.144*** -0.157*** -0.138***
> 41 percent -0.056*** -0.015 -0.052*** -0.037***
Winner ×
Probability of Treatment
33 to 66 percent 0.004* 0.031*** -0.009 0.014
> 66 percent -0.033*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.032***
Controls
Portfolio Size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPO Share Category Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.64 0.51 0.48 0.54
Number of observations 1,561,497 54,678 85,358 36,467
Dummies are based on quartile breakpoints of the respective distributions.
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